Users using the github-token input are impacted.
If the get-workflow-version-action step fails, the exception output may include the GITHUB_TOKEN. If the full token is included in the exception output, GitHub will automatically redact the secret from the GitHub Actions logs. However, the token may be truncated—causing part of the GITHUB_TOKEN to be displayed in plaintext in the GitHub Actions logs.
Anyone with read access to the GitHub repository can view GitHub Actions logs. For public repositories, anyone can view the GitHub Actions logs.
The opportunity to exploit this vulnerability is limited—the GITHUB_TOKEN is automatically revoked when the job completes. However, there is an opportunity for an attack in the time between the GITHUB_TOKEN being displayed in the logs and the completion of the job. Normally this is less than a second, but it may be greater if continue-on-error is used in the get-workflow-version-action step or if status check functions are used in a later step in the same job. For an example of an attack in the time between the GITHUB_TOKEN being displayed in the logs & the completion of the job, see https://www.praetorian.com/blog/codeqleaked-public-secrets-exposure-leads-to-supply-chain-attack-on-github-codeql/
For users who passed the GITHUB_TOKEN to the github-token input, update to v1.0.1. Any secrets that were partially leaked while using v1.0.0 should have already been revoked, since the GITHUB_TOKEN is automatically revoked when the job completes. However, in the unlikely event that an attack was executed using a...
1.0.1Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:LUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:NI:HA:HCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H