youki’s apparmor handling performs insufficiently strict write-target validation, which—combined with path substitution during pathname resolution—can allow writes to unintended procfs locations.
Weak write-target check
youki only verifies that the destination lies somewhere under procfs. As a result, a write intended for /proc/self/attr/apparmor/exec can succeed even if the path has been redirected to /proc/sys/kernel/hostname(which is also in procfs).
Path substitution While resolving a path component-by-component, a shared-mount race can substitute intermediate components and redirect the final target.
This is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering runc's original vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions.
0.5.7Exploitability
AV:LAC:LAT:PPR:LUI:AVulnerable System
VC:HVI:HVA:HSubsequent System
SC:HSI:HSA:HCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H